I. Introduction
This article explores the role of (decisions of) domestic courts in the case law of the International Court of Justice (JCJ). It takes as its point of departure that in the dominant perspective, the ICJ and domestic courts are worlds apart: they function in different legal systems and in different legal and political contexts.
1 This traditional perspective is under pressure, now that domestic courts increasingly are asked to examine the question of international law. This is mainly a consequence of the escalating degree to which international law deals with matters that are (also) regulated by domestic law/· as well as the allocation of international rights to individuals, who naturally tend to bring their claims befOre international courts and that has been highlighted in doctrine is only to a very limited ('Xtcnt visible in the lCJ. Due to the types of cases that have been submitted to the Court, the position adopted by the Court itselC as well as the cominued dominant role of sovereignty, 7 the ICJ does not provide the best examples of a possible trend towards judicial dialogue rather than hierarchical confrontation. Nonetheless, some recent cases show cracks in the traditional dichotomy between the ICJ and domestic courts and allow us to also conclude that the ICJ is not immune from the pressures of internationalization and relaxations of the boundaries between the international and the domestic spheres.
II. The development of international law
The first area in which we can examine a possible change in the relationship between the ICJ and domestic courts is the development of international law. In the traditional paradigm, the role of domestic courts in the development of international law is limited. The status of decisions of domestic courts as facts on the one hand and the structural differences benveen the domestic and the international legal order 8 on the other oppose a substantial impact of domestic case bw on dw imcm:ninn:tl
Tl
what extent the processes of internationalization of domestic case law and, more generally, the increasing interaction between domestic and international legal orders have caused a change in this situation.
II.A. Customary international law
The primary contribution of domestic courts to the development of international law probably is in their role as organs of States that arc relevant in the fOrmation of customary imcrnationallaw.9 This is in line with the status of national judicial acts as "facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States". 10 . Older ideas to the effect that Stare practice consists only of the practict of those organs capable, of ent(·ring into binding relations on behalf of the State (rdattd rht vitw rhat that customary law was tacit treaty law) now are generally n:·jecred. The same holds K1r the vi0A' that municipal court cases were only evidence of custom, not a I·Orce creating custom.
It made clear that, as other forms of practice, domestic case law will need to conform to rhe normal requirements for them to count towards the fOrmation of customary law. 12 Since judgments of municipal courts pertaining ro the alleged rule of international law regarding the exclusive competence of a flag State over its ships were conflicting and the rationales behind them unclear, the Court could not find in the national case law an indication of the existence of a rule of international law contended for by rhe French government.
13
More recently, the Court referred to domestic judgments as Stare practice in determining customary law on immunities in the Arrest Wan·tmt case. The Court noted:
The internationallaw. 16 The ICJ also can refer to (decisions of) domestic courts as analogies in their approach to particular legal issues. It is tO be recalled that while Judge McNair warned against importing principles from private law "lock stock and barrel" into international law, he did recognize that domestic principles may show a course to f(Jllow: " ... the rrue view of the duty of international tribunals in this matter is to regard any features or terminology which are reminiscent of rhe rules and institutions of private law as an indication of policy and principles." 33 In the case at hand, he went on to derive from the domestic concept of trust lessons for the mandate ~ystem. 34 There is indeed broad consensus rhat while automatic transplantation is ro he rejecrcd, domc\tic rrincipk~ can he rn:1de ;lpp!ic!hlc in rhc inkrn;Hiorul mnt,'x1 thwugb. ,t prvu..:~\ u( <~buauion, gcncnll;,;uion ,tnJ, more gl'lll:r:tlly, adjm1mcm. '"
The case law of the Court shows several examples in which the Court, or individual judges, followed examples of domestic case law or referred to them as background arguments.
In the Fjfi:ct ofAwards Advisory Opinion, the Court said:
the contention that the Gt:neral Assembly is inherently incapable of creating a tribunal competent w make decisions binding on itself cannot be accepted. lr cannot be justified by analogy to national laws, for it is common practice in national legislatures to create courts with the capacity ro render decisions legally binding on the legislatures which brought them into being. well as laws, in a different manner from what was customary when international life showed few changes. One of the considerations that supported that assertion was that:
. national courts, in their interpretation of private law, seek to adapt it to the exigencies of contemporary life, with the result that they have modified the law, sometimes swiftly and profoundly, even in countries where law is codified to such an extent that it is necessary today to take into consideration not only legal texts, but also case law. It is rhc same, a fOrtiori, in the interpretation of international matter, because international life is much more dynamic than national lifc. One of the consequences of the notion of domestic judgments as facts is that such judgments can be defining parts of the cause of a dispute 51 that the Court then will attempt to solve by applying international law. In that respect, there is no difference bervveen a decision of a domestic court, a legislative or executive act, or some other "fact" that causes a dispute.
There is ample evidence in the case law of the Court that decisions of domestic courts can be (part of) the cause of a dispute. In some cases, ir may be possible ro single out domestic judgments as causes of disputes. Since it is accepted that judicial decisions can result in Stare The status of domestic cases as facts has practical consequences. One is that while the Court may be called upon to express itself upon the application of a particular domestic rule (e.g. the procedural default rule), it will not examine whether a domestic court has acted properly under domestic law. The Coun must confine itself to examining whether such application is in accordance wid1 the obligations which international law imposes on the State in question.6s Another consequence is that the Court will be obliged to reach a decision with is tO be regarded merely as a fan but such facts may be proved "by means of any researches which the Court may think lit w undcnake or to cause tO be undertaken").
67 La Grand, above n.6l, para.52. This overlap is particularly dear when a claim is brought and/or decided on the basis of international law that has been made valid within the domestic legal order. In a fCw cases, the Coun suggested that the eff-Cctivcness oflocal remedies depended on the possibility that the claimant could invoke in the domestic court, at least in substance, rhe same rules of international law that later formed the core of the dispute before the JCJ. In the lnterhandel case, the Coun found it relevant to consider the possibilicy of resolving the dispute in the 'fhere has been a tendency in rhe practice of courts of many States to regard international law, in some way, as forming part of national law or as entering legitimately into the national conception of ordre public. Although the Norwegian Government has admitted rhat in no case can a Norwegian coun overrule Norwegian legislation on the ground that it is contrary to international law, it has asserted that it is possible that a Norwegian court may consider international law to form part of the law of the 77 El-51, ahovc n.7l, 47, para.62.
78 lbid.
The possibility of overlapping claims is not limited to cases involving the exhaustion of local remedies. In the A!Jena case, the Court observed that "Tn these special circumstances of interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights, the duty to exhaust local remedies did nor apply". 79 on rhe same rule of international law that later is invoked in the TCJ, the international procedure, in principle, will be based on a separate and independent cause of action. 81 Moreover, in the relationship between domestic courts and the ICJ, the principle of res judicata is not applicable. 82 The Court can review the compatibility of a domestic ruling on a matter of international law with international law itself.
However, an alternative, less fOrmalistic account is possible. In this account, domestic courts and the ICJ have complementary roles with respect to what, in substance, can be (part of) the same dispute. l<'or our purposes, the question is whether we find evidence for it in the case law of the Court. To enable that assessment, we can derive from the literature two main clements {or stages) that would characterize a judicial dialogue.
A first clement is that, partly as a consequence of the local remedies rule, domestic courts have the primary role in adjudicating the claim. The role of the IC], then, would be a subsidiary one, which may be also be described as "backstopping domestic institutions where they fail to act". 83 It acts if and to the extent rhat domestic courts have failed to apply (the substance of) international law properly.
A key feature of this subsidiary role, then, would be that when the Court is asked to adjudicate a matter that, in whole or in part, has been considered in a domestic court, it should, to a ccnain extent, defer co prior assessments of domestic courts. 85 Young, for instance, argues that decisions should be allocated co particular institutions on the basis of institutional competence and that decisions by rhe primary institution, once made, should generally be respected absenr a sufficiently good reason for overruling them. 86 The the qualiry of the HCJ's judgment seems to be superior to that of the ICJ 111 several respects. Arguably, this reflects some of the inherem advantages of national adjudication over international adjudication, whose acknowledgement should inspire international couns to improve their level of performance or to accord greater deference to national courts. 93 An additional reason fOr deference might be that in many cases (IaGrand and Avena are illustrative), the international claim is intenwined with aspects of domestic law and the ICJ is not well positioned to consider such matters of domestic law.
However, the empirical support for the above account is very thin. The lCJ Advisory
Opinion on the ~\·ep11nztion Wall did nor acknowledge any advantages in terms of factfinding that the Israeli Supreme Court may have had and it did not assign any weight to irs decision on the legality of the separation barrier. 95 ln Lr1Gmnd and Avenil, rhe Court did not have the possibility to show much deference, as rhe US courts did not adjudicate the claims based on international law. 'fhe interesting scenario, which could have provided some evidence fOr the above construction, could have materialized if the US courts had considered the claims based on Article 36 of the Vienna Convenrion but rejected them because of, for instance, lack of prejudice. If, after the US courts had had a chance to revie\v and reconsider individual convictions, the case had come back to the ICJ, it might be better positioned to daril}r irs position on deference to domestic courts.
The second elenl.ent of the dialogue is that domestic courts can or should play a meaningful role in the implementation of judgments of the ICJ. Arguably, the instirutional advantages of the domestic courts (e.g. better capacity to appreciate the facts, greater enforceability of decisions) should be recognized by leaving to domestic courts some margin of appreciation in implementing the international decision.% There is indeed some evidence In response to Mexico's arguments, which aimed to limit rhe discretion of the United States in choosing how ro provide review and reconsideration, the ICJ held that the determination of whether confessions or statements obtained prior to the time at which the national is infOrmed of his right to consular assistance were ro be excluded would have to be made on a case-by-case basis by US courts during the process of review and reconsiderarion. 99 The review and reconsideration by domestic courts thus have two purposes: first, to assess whether the defendanr suffered actual prejudice from the violation; and second, if so, to place, we frequently encounter misunderstandings leading to erroneous conclusions" .
